The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations by Anup Malani et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations
Volume Author/Editor: Edward L. Glaeser, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-29785-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/glae03-1
Conference Date: January 17-19, 2002
Publication Date: January 2003
Title: Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector.
A Synthesis and Empirical Evaluation
Author: Anup Malani, Tomas Philipson, Guy David
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9970181
Much economic activity occurs in the not-for-proﬁt (NFP) sector of the
U.S. economy. Not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms—deﬁned primarily by their exemption
from certain forms of taxation and by the requirement that the surplus of
revenues over expenses not be distributed to the ﬁrm’s owner or patron (the
so-called nondistribution constraint)—are estimated to produce one-ﬁfth
of all American research and development, most of the economy’s human
capital that is not produced by on-the-job training, many important cul-
tural products and services, and most health care services. Within the NFP
sector, production is dominated by health care providers, which account
for about one-half of NFP employment. Education and research make up
the second largest component of NFP employment, at about 20 percent,
followed by social services, such as child care and job training, at about 15
percent.
Given the importance of the NFP sector for economic activity, a large
body of theoretical and empirical work has emerged to describe and docu-
ment how NFP ﬁrms behave, focusing in particular on how they behave
diﬀerently than for-proﬁt (FP) ﬁrms. (In light of the large share of NFP
production accounted for by health care providers, much of this work was
developed with the health care industry in mind.) While this literature is ex-
tensive, it is not coordinated. There is no accepted theory of NFP behav-
ior, and little of the empirical work is connected to—let alone compares—
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paper attempts to synthesize a few of the dominant theories of NFP ﬁrms
into a common framework, and to connect existing empirical literature on
NFPs to this common theoretical framework. We retain the focus on
health care. The goal will be to answer two sets of questions:
1. Do existing theories generate diﬀerent predictions for NFP behavior
with respect to a common set of observable outcomes (e.g., factor demand
curves, ﬁrm size, response to demand or supply shocks) such that empiri-
cal work can determine which theory best describes NFP behavior? In
short, what is the empirical content of existing theories of NFP ﬁrms?
2. Does empirical work exist that examines the behavior of NFP ﬁrms
with respect to outcomes on which the diﬀerent theories of NFP ﬁrms gen-
erate diﬀerent predictions? In other words, does the existing empirical liter-
ature allow one to discriminate among the diﬀerent theories of NFP ﬁrms?
The paper can be outlined as follows. Section 6.1 synthesizes existing the-
ories of NFP behavior into a common empirical framework. The goal is to
generate, for each theory, predictions regarding a common set of observable
outcomes. The common framework insures that predictions for a given out-
come from two diﬀerent theories are mainly the product of the theories’ as-
sumptions regarding NFP ﬁrms, and not diﬀerences in modeling technol-
ogy, demand, or the marketplace. A shortcoming of existing theories of NFP
behavior is that the predictions of their authors have focused on NFP behav-
ior almost exclusively at the ﬁrm level as opposed to at the industry (i.e., equi-
librium) level. Section 6.1 concludes with an analysis of such predictions.
Section 6.2 extends existing theories by generating predictions about in-
dustry-level behavior in equilibrium under perfect competition. The ap-
proach is similar to that in Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998, 2002). Focus-
ing on industry-level predictions is important because most empirical
work that compares NFP and FP ﬁrms examines the behavior of these
ﬁrms in equilibrium with mixed production. Section 6.2 concludes that
there are few observable outcomes at the industry level with respect to
which the diﬀerent theories of NFPs generate diﬀerent predictions.
Section 6.3 examines a large number of the existing empirical studies of
NFP ﬁrms to determine the extent to which they provide evidence com-
paring the behavior of NFP and FP ﬁrms on outcomes with regard to
which existing theories generate diﬀerent predictions. Generally, we ﬁnd
that very few studies examine such outcomes and thus permit us to distin-
guish theories based on their empirical performance. Producing evidence
regarding measures that permit such distinction appears to be a fertile
ground for future research.
Section 6.4 concludes that, if forced to choose among existing theories,
we would select theories which argue that the distinctive behavior of NFP
ﬁrms can be explained by the altruistic motives of these ﬁrms’ principals as
182 Anup Malani, Tomas Philipson, and Guy Davidmost consistent with available evidence. This conclusion is subject to nu-
merous caveats in addition to the limited value of the existing empirical
studies to distinguish among existing theories. The most notable is that, be-
cause we were interested primarily in theories seeking to explain ﬁrm be-
havior (as opposed to employee or government behavior), the paper does
not cover all possible theories of the NFP sector, including those that may
potentially perform better from an empirical perspective. For example,
Weisbrod (1975) considers the creation of NFP services as a product of
imperfect Lindahl pricing of public goods. Another caveat is that our re-
view of the empirical literature focuses exclusively on the health care sec-
tor. Our vision is limited in this way because NFP behavior in the health
care sector is better studied than NFP behavior in other sectors, because
health care providers dominate the NFP sector and because, unlike (say)
the education industry, the health care industry is largely characterized by
mixed NFP and FP production, which allows direct comparisons of NFP
and FP behavior in equilibrium.
This paper relates to and complements existing reviews of the NFP liter-
ature (see, e.g., Pauly 1987, Rose-Ackerman 1996, and Sloan 2000). The
main diﬀerence between this review and others lies in its objectives of at-
tempting to draw out explicitly the diﬀering, testable predictions of existing
formal theories and of attempting to point out where the existing empirical
evidence allows us to distinguish between those predictions. Although
there are many existing surveys of the NFP sector, none of them to our
knowledge appear to focus in an explicit and formal way on this objective.
6.1 Firm Behavior in the Nonproﬁt Sector: A Synthesis
This section presents a baseline model of the ﬁrm that can, with certain
parameter restrictions, capture the essential features of the more dominant
formalized theories of NFP ﬁrm behavior. The model starts with the stan-
dard neoclassical model of the ﬁrm, which has the advantage of being fa-
miliar to most readers, and adds three features. The ﬁrm is assumed to
have an owner who may have preferences over the ﬁrm attributes other
than proﬁts. There may be restrictions on the income that the owner can
draw from the ﬁrm (nondistribution constraint) and on the output deci-
sions of the ﬁrm (implied, e.g., by ﬁduciary duties imposed by state law).
Finally, government tax policies may cause the cost function and after-tax
proﬁts of NFP ﬁrms to deviate from those of FP ﬁrms. Careful speciﬁca-
tion of these three features permits the baseline model to mimic the essen-
tial features of existing theories of NFP ﬁrms. Incorporating each of the
theories into a common theoretical framework in this manner has a num-
ber of advantages. First, it permits us to generate predictions regarding
ﬁrm behavior that we can be sure are driven by the key assumptions each
theory makes about how NFP ﬁrms operate, and not by diﬀerences in the
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Second, the neoclassical model permits easy derivation of predictions re-
garding industry-level behavior in equilibrium, a feature that, surprisingly,
is missing from most existing theories. Moreover, the formal modeling of a
ﬁrm’s owner allows us to make the choice of organizational form endoge-
nous, also a feature missing in many existing models. This is important, not
only because it introduces a dose of realism, but also because it may aﬀect
equilibrium dynamics, such as whether each model can sustain an equilib-
rium with mixed FP and NFP production as is observed in the health care
and child care sectors.
This section proceeds in three parts. First, it sets forth the baseline
model. Then it demonstrates how the baseline model can capture the
essence of the three major theories of NFP ﬁrm behavior. One theory is ex-
plicitly based on the altruistic preferences of owners; another posits that
the NFP ﬁrm is operated like a producer cooperative; and the ﬁnal one is
based on the view that NFP ﬁrms exist because they mitigate the incentives
of ﬁrms to take advantage of consumers in market where important prod-
uct attributes are noncontractible. The third part of this section presents a
series of ﬁrm-level predictions implied by each theory. The predictions are
generated from the baseline model employing the restrictions required to
replicate the results of each theory. In many cases these predictions are new
and therefore extensions of existing theories. We focus on predictions for a
small set of outcomes that are measurable. The goal is to not just to develop
testable predictions, but to focus on a common set of outcomes where the
theories generate diﬀerent predictions so that empirical observation can
determine which theory performs better than the rest.
6.1.1 General Model
Consider a ﬁrm that has access to a production technology F and whose
owner or patron derives utility u from consumption z, a vector of inputs x,
output y of the ﬁrm, and quality q of the ﬁrm’s output.1 The ﬁrm’s type is
indicated by the index i, where i   f indicates a FP ﬁrm, and i   n indicates
an NFP ﬁrm. Whether the ﬁrm is FP or NFP, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given by
(1)  i(y, q)   pi(y, q)   y   ci(y, q)   Ai,
where pi(y, q) is the inverse demand function, ci(y, q) is the cost function
for quantity and quality of output,2 and Ai is donations from any source.
We assume that the owner seeks to maximize her utility u(z, y, x, q) subject
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1. It is useful to think of the agent making decisions in an FP ﬁrm as the owner of the ﬁrm
and in an NFP ﬁrm as the charitable donor or patron of the ﬁrm or as the head of the board
that governs the ﬁrm. We assume there is no division between ownership (or patronage) and
control.
2. The cost function ci(y, q) can equivalently be written as wxi(y, q), where w is a vector of
input prices and xi is the input demand function a ﬁrm of form i faces. This alternative for-
mulation permits easy analysis of cases where ﬁrms get independent utility (or disutility) from
the use of inputs. We will use ci and wxi interchangeably throughout.to the constraint that her consumption zmust be covered by income Ifrom
the ﬁrm as allowed by the government.
If the ﬁrm is FP, that income is simply total proﬁts. Thus the owner’s/pa-
tron’s budget constraint is
(2) z   If    f   p f   y   wx   Af,
where w is a vector of input prices. (We shall omit the arguments [y, q] of
p, c, and   to simplify our exposition, wherever the omission should cause
no confusion.)
If the ﬁrm is NFP, cash income is constrained to be zero. This is known
as the nondistribution constraint. The owner/patron can, however, draw
noncash income in the form of perquisites such as a nice oﬃce and a com-
pany car. We can formalize this regulation of NFP income in the budget
constraint.3
(3) z   In   d( n)   d(pn   y   wx)
We assume d(m)  m, reﬂecting the fact that the utility from cash is at least
as high as the utility from perks because all perks can be purchased with
cash.4 Think of d(m) as the income that would provide the same level of
utility as m dollars spent on perks. The function d(m) is decreasing in the
owner’s/patron’s relative distaste for perks versus cash and in the legal con-
straints the state imposes on the sorts of perks NFP ﬁrms can purchase for
its patrons. In addition to the nondistribution constraint, NFPs may be
subject to regulations requiring that they serve (e.g., a religious, charitable,
scientiﬁc, or educational purpose; see Internal Revenue Code §501[c][3]) or
that they satisfy certain ﬁduciary duties to the putative beneﬁciaries of the
NFP ﬁrm. These constraints can be formalized by requiring (y, q)   N,
where N represents the set of outputs satisfying this second type of NFP
regulation. The beneﬁt of NFP status is that NFP ﬁrms get tax breaks from
the government that reduce their costs and that, under certain conditions,
may be able to command higher prices in equilibrium based on consumer
preferences for products produced by NFP ﬁrms. Formally, we can write
the cost and price beneﬁts of NFP status as
(4a) cn(y, q)   cf(y, q), cn
y(y, q)   cf
y(y, q), cn
q(y, q)   cf
q(y, q),
(4b) pn(y, q)   pf(y, q).
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3. In both the NFP and FP cases, the owner/patron gets a cash wage for his labor. Because
the NFP wage is constrained by law to be competitive and because the owner/patron is likely
to be paid a salary rather than an hourly wage, we assume that the cash wage drawn from an
NFP ﬁrm is the same as that from an FP ﬁrm and thus that wage can be omitted from the in-
come statements in equations (2) and (3). Of course, if the owner’s/patron’s cash wage is pro-
portional to output, then we may not be able to make this assumption because the two types
of ﬁrms may produce diﬀerent levels of output.
4. We ignore the discount on perks aﬀorded by the tax code, which permits ﬁrms to treat
perks as deductible business expenses because NFP ﬁrms need not pay corporate income
taxes.The owner of the FP ﬁrm has the induced utility function v( f(y, q), y,
x, q)   u( f(y, q), y, x, q) with income If    f, and the owner of the NFP
ﬁrm has the induced utility function v(d( n(y, q)), y, x, q)   u(d( n(y, q)),
y, x, q) with income In   d( n) and (y, q) constrained to belong to N. Let
yi∗, qi∗ be the optimal output and quality choices of an owner a ﬁrm of
form i with preferences v.
The nice feature of this baseline model is that it permits us to treat as en-
dogenous the choice of organizational form. Thus, before entering a mar-
ket, the owner/patron can choose whether to organize the ﬁrm as FP or
NFP. The choice of organizational form requires a balancing of the costs
and beneﬁts of FP and NFP status given the owner’s preferences. The
costs of NFP status are the nondistribution constraint and the NFP regu-
lations embodied in the constraint that (y, q)   N; the beneﬁts are the tax
and price advantages. The owner/patron will choose NFP status for the
ﬁrm if
(5) v[d( n(yn∗, qn∗)), yn∗, x(yn∗, qn∗), qn∗] 
  v[ f(yf∗, qf∗), yf∗, x(yf∗, qf∗), qf∗].
6.1.2 Altruism Models
The oldest and most common formal models of NFP institutions em-
phasize the role of altruistic intentions of NFP managers. This altruism is
captured by including quantity and quality of output in the objective func-
tion of the ﬁrm.5 The ﬁrst paper to do this is Newhouse (1970).6 That pa-
per models NFP hospitals as maximizing utility over quantity and qual-
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5. Including quantity or quality in a ﬁrm’s utility function does not perfectly capture altru-
ism. If a ﬁrm were truly altruistic, it would not care whether it supplied the market or another
ﬁrm did. The only issue would be whether consumers were satisﬁed. Indeed, Friedman (1970)
has criticized the literature for failing to explain why an altruistic ﬁrm would not simply take
FP status, use its proﬁts to purchase output from the most eﬃcient ﬁrm on the market, and
distributing this output to the needy.
One can justify the impure-preference assumptions of altruism models, however, in two
ways. First, perhaps ﬁrms are not truly altruistic. Rather, they may seek the warm glow they
get from actually serving the needy directly. Second, perhaps there are logistical problems
with Friedman’s solution. In markets characterized by information asymmetry between pro-
ducers and purchasers, simply purchasing output and redistributing it will not insure that
the needy get quality products. Or there may be search costs to ﬁnding the needy and those
search costs may be lower for producers. Preston (1988) makes a similar point in response
to the question why workers donate their time to socially beneﬁcial organizations rather than
work longer at their regular jobs and donate their wages, a donation which would be tax
deductible.
Frank and Salkever (1991) have a model that includes total industry output in the utility
function of ﬁrms. However, that model does not contrast NFP and FP ﬁrms. Rather, it is de-
signed to explain the response of altruistic hospitals to increases in government production of
health care.
6. See also Feldstein (1971) and Hansmann (1981). Long (1964) discusses a similar theory
about the motivations of NFP ﬁrms, but does not formalize his model. Baumol and Bowen
(1965) do the same, again without formalization. Baumol (1959) has a theory of a revenue-
maximizing ﬁrm, but Baumol does not apply his theory to the NFP sector.ity—but not proﬁts—subject to a budget constraint.7 The primary predic-
tion of the Newhouse model is that NFP ﬁrms will have a bias toward pro-
ducing in higher-quality markets. The return to the owner’s/patron’s pro-
ducing greater quantity of higher-quality products is greater than the
return from producing more and lower-quality products.
Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998, 2002) generalize Newhouse’s model by
including proﬁts in the ﬁrm’s objective function. Their paper also examines
the behavior of NFP ﬁrms in equilibrium. As such the paper yields predic-
tions regarding which owners/patrons choose NFP status for their ﬁrms,
when we should expect to see mixed production versus just NFP or FP pro-
duction, and for how markets with mixed production respond to demand
and supply shocks. Only owners with output or quality preferences choose
NFP status. The beneﬁts of NFP status (access to donations) do not pro-
vide any advantages to owners/patrons interested only in income. Owners/
patrons interested in quantity and perhaps quality start NFP ﬁrms only in
product markets where there are donations to ﬁnance them. If able to se-
cure donations, these owners’/patrons’ preference for quantity produces
the same equilibrium behavior from NFP ﬁrms as a FP ﬁrm interested only
in proﬁts but in possession of a technology that lowers the marginal costs
of producing quantity. Thus FP ﬁrms will be the marginal ﬁrms in product
markets with NFP production. For-proﬁt ﬁrms will produce only where
donations—assumed to be scarce—cannot sustain enough NFP ﬁrms to
satisfy total market demand.
Lakdawalla and Philipson note that the response of markets with mixed
production to demand and supply shocks depends on whether owners/pa-
trons of NFP ﬁrms have, in addition to a preference for proﬁts, a prefer-
ence for quantity or a preference for both quantity and quality. If quantity
only, an increase in demand will induce entry by FP ﬁrms (NFP ﬁrms are
constrained by a limited supply of donations) and thus raise the FP share
of output. If ﬁrms have heterogeneous costs, price will rise. Supply shocks,
such as a reduction in NFP costs due to expanded tax breaks, will increase
the share of NFP output. Conversely, an increase in public production,
which has the same eﬀect as reducing market demand for private produc-
tion, trades oﬀone-for-one with FP output. If NFP ﬁrms have a preference
for quality as well, the results above hold for any given level of quality.
Capturing the altruism models in our general model is straightforward.
The objective functions are virtually identical. Lakdawalla and Philipson’s
model contemplates the introduction of inputs into the owner’s/patron’s
preferences. Because the authors do not explore this avenue, it can be
assumed that (like in the Newhouse model) v x is zero. The main constraint
imposed by a status of NFP in Lakdawalla and Philipson is that N  
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7. The analysis is primarily graphical, but Phelps (1997) provides a mathematical formal-
ization.{(y, q) n(y, q)   0}. As a legal matter this is an unrealistic restriction:
NFP ﬁrms can earn rents, they just cannot distribute them to owners. Un-
der perfect competition, however, proﬁts are driven to zero and thus the
constraint of N does not bind. There are no perks in the altruism models.
Both the Lakdawalla and Philipson and the Newhouse models ignore the
tax beneﬁts of NFP status8 and assume that consumers have no preference
for products produced by NFPs.
6.1.3 Physician Cooperative Model
Pauly and Redisch (1973) propose an alternative to the altruism theory
that models the NFP hospital as a physician cooperative. The theory can be
justiﬁed in the following manner. Because doctors have superior medical
knowledge, they have the potential to control resource allocation in the hos-
pital. In an FP hospital there is an outside investor who, due to her claim on
residual earnings, has an incentive to acquire the knowledge required to
compete with doctors for control over resource decisions within the hospi-
tal.9 Thus the doctors in an FP hospital do not make input and output de-
cisions. In the NFP hospital, however, there is no residual claimant, so no
party competes with the medical staﬀ for control. Thus the doctors on the
medical staﬀ in an NFP hospital can perfect their authority over the hospi-
tal. These doctors treat the medical staﬀ as a partnership and make input
and output decisions to maximize the joint income of the medical staﬀ.10
Pauly and Redisch analyze long-run equilibrium when all hospitals are
NFP but there are three possible forms of organization for the medical
staﬀ.11 The most interesting is the closed medical staﬀ, which restricts
staﬃng privileges (i.e., staﬀ size) and pays each doctor on the staﬀ
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8. The absence of tax breaks for NFPs makes the choice of regulatory form trivial in Lak-
dawalla and Philipson’s theory. Without tax advantages to NFP status, there is no reason an
owner interested solely in proﬁts would take NFP, even if perks were allowed. Exploring the
baseline model with tax breaks and perks reveals a weakness with the Lakdawalla and Philip-
son model. The baseline model with purely proﬁt-maximizing owners, tax breaks, and perks
can yield the same equilibrium predictions as the Lakdawalla and Philipson model. The only
diﬀerence is that NFP ﬁrms rather than FP ﬁrms would be the higher-cost ﬁrms. Another
weakness in the Lakdawalla and Philipson theory is that it assumes NFP market share is ﬁ-
nanced by donations. Yet, in the hospital market, which is perhaps the largest sector with
mixed production, donations make up a tiny fraction of revenue but NFPs dominate market
share. Rose-Ackerman (1996, 705). It is hard to imagine that it is the small amount of dona-
tions to NFP hospitals that enables such hospitals to dominate the market.
9. In most FP hospitals, the outside investor is herself a physician (Gray 1993). This makes
it easier for the outside investor to wrest control over resources from the medical staﬀ.
10. Pauly and Redisch justify their model solely on the grounds that physicians, by virtue
of their superior knowledge, have de facto control over hospital resources. They do not at-
tempt to explain, for example, why physicians in a FP facility do not enjoy the same level of
control as physicians in a NFP facility. Thus, the story we tell in this paragraph is an attempt
to rationalize, as best we can, Pauly and Redisch’s treatment of a NFP hospital, but not a FP
hospital, as a physician cooperative.
11. Shalit (1977) constructs a model that is related to Pauly and Redisch’s. His goal is to de-
scribe the equilibrium behavior of what he calls doctor-hospital cartels. The proﬁt functionequally.12 This staﬀ sets the marginal revenue product (MRP) of the physi-
cian labor to the net average revenue product (NARP) of the physician. If
p is the total price for health care (including the hospital and physician
charges), mis physician labor, kis physical capital (with rental price r), and
l is nonphysician labor (with wage w), then the equilibrium condition is
(6) MRP m   (p   y   p y)   y m    NARP m
and mc in ﬁgure 6.1 is the closed staﬀ’s choice for the size of the physician
staﬀ.13
p   y   r   k   w   l
   
m
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Fig. 6.1 Long-run equilibrium in the physician cooperative model
of these cartels is the same as that of the labor-managed ﬁrms of Pauly and Redisch, with doc-
tors as the labor input and hospitals as the capital input. Shalit, however, does not describe or
distinguish NFP hospitals as doctor-managed (or cartel) ﬁrms and FP hospitals as non-
cartels. In his model, doctors manage all health care ﬁrms, regardless of whether they are as-
sociated with NFP for FP hospital inputs.
12. The second type of staﬀ is the open staﬀ. Here the staﬀ is not restricted and any physi-
cian who wishes to may join. Each doctor is still paid equally. In this case the staﬀ is a com-
mon pool and physicians join until the net average revenue product of physician labor is equal
to the marginal or opportunity cost of physician labor. If s0 is the long-run physician supply
curve, the result is a staﬀ size of mo   mc.
The third form of organization for the medical staﬀ is premised on insight that closed med-
ical staﬀs can increase the rents that they earn if they can add doctors to the medical staﬀ, but
treat them as hired or associate physicians and pay them the marginal product of their labor,
rather than as partners, who must be paid a pro rata share of residual earnings. (This may ﬁt
the division between the medical staﬀ and residents at hospitals.) This sort of medical staﬀ is
called the discriminatory sharing staﬀ. This staﬀ will have the same number of partners mc as
a closed staﬀ and retain mf – mc physicians as hired staﬀ. The total size of the medical staﬀ
will be the same as in the FP hospital, which expands the medical staﬀ until the MRP of the
last physician is just equal to the market wage of physicians.
13. Pauly and Redisch also discuss a variant of the closed staﬀ: the closed staﬀ with imper-
fect cooperation. The doctors control the amount of hospital output (physical capital andThe purpose of Pauly and Redisch’s (1973) paper is not so much to pro-
duce a model with testable predictions as to provide a model that might ex-
plain stylized facts from the hospital market.14 For example, they claim
their closed medical staﬀ model explains why NFP ﬁrms tend to use more
physical capital inputs and nonphysician labor than FP ﬁrms. They also
note that with closed staﬀs one ﬁnds hospitals that are too small, as mea-
sured by their physician labor inputs. Physicians who are refused entry in
existing staﬀs open new hospitals with their own closed staﬀs where they
can earn more money than if they joined existing open staﬀs. This, Pauly
and Redisch claim, explains both why hospitals are below their cost-
minimizing size and why there is duplication of facilities in the hospital in-
dustry. Finally, they claim their model explains the positive relationship be-
tween hospital insurance coverage and hospital unit prices observed by
Feldstein (1971). If cost-based insurance covers part of each patient’s hos-
pital bill, the factor prices of hospital inputs (capital and nonphysician la-
bor) that medical staﬀs face are reduced. This produces an increase in the
usage of hospital inputs relative to physician inputs, which in turn raises
hospital unit prices.
Pauly and Redisch’s closed staﬀ model of NFP hospitals ﬁts neatly into
our general model when owners/patrons (physicians) are assumed to care
only about income (i.e., v y   v q   0); but the NFP form permits owners/
patrons to take only a pro rata share of proﬁts home as income (i.e., I  
d[ ]    /x0, where x0 is the total number of owners/patrons [physicians]
employed at the ﬁrm). This constraint is not imposed by the nondistribu-
tion constraint so much as the politics of rent-seeking in a ﬁrm without a
clear residual claimant. Pauly and Redisch do not discuss the constraints
imposed by governmental NFP regulations or the beneﬁts conferred on
NFPs by government tax policies. Thus we can assume that N is uncon-
strained and that there are no cost or price advantages associated with
NFP status.15
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non-physician labor). The hospital charges doctors for output such that the hospital just
breaks even. So doctors are charged only the average cost of output, which they pass on to pa-
tients. Physicians then separately charge patients for their own labor costs plus any rents the
hospital foregoes by billing doctors at average cost. Physicians respond by shifting their mix
of inputs to favor physical capital and non-physician labor, up to where the marginal revenue
product of these inputs equals their average cost.
14. Thus, the Pauly and Redisch model suﬀers from the limitation that the authors do not
derive equilibrium implications from their model in the presence of competition with mixed
production.
15. It should be noted that, because the physician’s cooperative theory of hospitals is anal-
ogous to earlier cooperative ﬁrm theories, such as Ward (1958), Vanec (1970), Meade (1972),
and Domar (1966), the theory shares some of the troublesome implications of those prior the-
ories, implications for which there seem to be little empirical support. For example, an up-
ward shift in the demand curve for hospital output could result in higher prices, lower output,
and smaller medical staﬀs. An increase in factor prices may lead to an increase in the medical
staﬀ, while a lump sum subsidy may decrease output and staﬀ size.6.1.4 Noncontractible Quality Model
The next class of models rests on the view that consumers in many mar-
kets cannot contract on product quality. Hansmann (1980, 1996) hypothe-
sizes that NFP ﬁrms exist because they can overcome this problem. Easley
and O’Hara (1983)16 and Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) present formal mod-
els that use the assumption of noncontractible quality to motivate the exis-
tence of NFP ﬁrms.17 The logic of these models is that, when consumers
cannot contract on product quality, FP ﬁrms have an incentive to shirk on
quality because this will lower their costs and increase their unit proﬁts
without loss of sales. The nondistribution constraint on NFP ﬁrms miti-
gates this incentive because it limits the ability of NFP ﬁrms to distribute
proﬁts to the owner/patron. Therefore, consumers of products character-
ized by noncontractible quality prefer to purchase from NFP ﬁrms. In
eﬀect, NFP status serves as a signal of noncontractible quality. The signal
falls in value if the government does not enforce the nondistribution con-
straint, allowing FP ﬁrms to cloak themselves in NFP status but still oper-
ate as FP ﬁrms—what Weisbrod (1988) calls “for-proﬁts-in-disguise.”
Our analysis of the noncontractible quality theory for explaining NFP
production focuses on Glaeser and Shleifer’s (2001) model because it is the
most streamlined formal version of the theory. Glaeser and Shleifer’s
model has three periods. In period 1, a consumer agrees to purchase one
unit of product at price p. In period 2, the ﬁrm’s owner/patron engages in
cost-cutting eﬀort e, which reduces costs by k(e), where k is positive and
concave. Total costs are c(q) – k(e), where c is the cost of producing a unit
of observable quality q. Cost cutting reduces unobservable quality accord-
ing to –me, where m is a constant. The ﬁrm delivers a unit of the good with
observable quality q in period 3. The consumer’s willingness to pay, and
hence the price, is q – mE[e] and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are   p – c(q)   k(e).
In period 0, before any market transactions, the ﬁrm’s owner/patron de-
cides whether to organize the ﬁrm as an NFP or an FP. The owner/patron
has preferences over income I and eﬀort e such that v(I, e)   I – e. If the
owner/patron organizes the ﬁrm as an FP, her income is simply proﬁts, I  
 . If she organizes as an NFP, she cannot take proﬁts home as cash. She
must consume proﬁts through perks. Hence her utility is the cash value of
these perks minus the cost of eﬀort. We can think of this restriction as im-
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16. Easley and O’Hara (1983) model the NFP ﬁrm as the sometimes-optimal solution to
the principal-agent problem in which consumers are principals and producers are agents.
They ﬁnd that NFP status dominates FP status as a solution in very rare cases. Therefore, the
model is not empirically very relevant.
17. Hirth (1999) extends the analysis by showing the equilibrium relationship between, on
the one hand, NFP status as a signal of unobservable quality (measured by the price premium
such ﬁrms may command) and, on the other hand, the share of the population that cannot
observe quality and how well the nondistribution constraint on NFPs is enforced.posing a discount on the cash value of the entrepreneur’s proﬁts: I   d .
The ﬁrm will choose NFP status if
d[q   mE(en)   c(q)   k(en)]   en   q   mE(ef)   c(q)   k(ef)   ef,
where en and ef indicate choices of eﬀort by NFP and FP ﬁrms, respec-
tively. These are chosen to maximize the left- and right-hand sides, respec-
tively, of the previous inequality.
This model yields a number of predictions. First, NFP ﬁrms invest less
eﬀort in cost-cutting eﬀort because the returns to such investment are
lower: dk(en) versus k(ef). Hence NFP ﬁrms produce higher levels of un-
observable quality: –me. Second, NFP ﬁrms should dominate markets
where consumers value noncontractible quality. This is a direct implication
of en   ef. Third, NFP status becomes less desirable as the proﬁtability of
the industry rises because the utility forgone from consumption of proﬁts
through perks is linear in proﬁts: (1 – d) . If consumers have heteroge-
neous tastes for unobservable quality and ﬁrms have heterogeneous costs,
then we might have mixed production, with NFP ﬁrms tending to produce
higher levels of noncontractible quality and FP ﬁrms tending to have lower
costs.18 If one were to add a taste for (noncontractible) quality to the pref-
erences of entrepreneurs, the model, not surprisingly, yields the conclusion
that the greater the entrepreneur’s preference for quality, the more likely
she is to choose NFP status and the higher is the (noncontractible) quality
that NFP ﬁrms produce, relative to FPs.
While all these predictions are intuitively pleasing, they are generally
diﬃcult to test. (The exception is that low-cost ﬁrms choose FP status.) We
can, however, mimic the equilibrium behavior of Glaeser and Shleifer’s
(2001) model with our general theory of NFP ﬁrms and use that theory to
generate testable predictions. Toward this end, assume that owners/patrons
have preferences only over income and cost-cutting eﬀort, e, such that
v(I, e)   v(I – e). Second, assume owners/patrons of NFP ﬁrms can take
proﬁts home only as perks, I   d( ). Third, assume cost-cutting eﬀort re-
duces cost, i.e., that ce(y, q, e)   0, cee   0, where q is contractible quality,
but at the expense of noncontractible quality at a rate of m. Since con-
sumers value contractible and noncontractible quality equally, price is pro-
portional to q – mE(ei), where i is the regulatory form of the ﬁrm. Con-
sumers cannot contract on eﬀort, but can contract on regulatory form.
They oﬀer NFP ﬁrms high prices given contractible quality because they
know such ﬁrms have less incentive to cut costs in ways that reduce non-
contractible quality. Finally, assume no regulatory constraints on the out-
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18. While Glaeser and Shleifer explain situations in which mixed production is possible,
they do not derive any predictions regarding the behavior of NFP ﬁrms in a competitive equi-
librium with mixed production.put of NFP ﬁrms (N unrestricted) and that there are no tax subsidies for
NFPs, so E(cn)   E(cf).
6.1.5 Firm-Level Predictions of Existing Theories
In this section we derive implications of each of the three theories of
NFP behavior just described for ﬁrm-level behavior. We focus on the diﬀer-
ences in behavior between FP and NFP ﬁrms along a limited range of ob-
servable outcomes. For reference, the constraints on the baseline model im-
plied by the three theories discussed in sections 6.1.2–6.1.4 are summarized
in table 6.1. Table 6.2 summarizes our predictions. Implications of the al-
truism theory are developed assuming owners/patrons have a preference
only for income, quantity, and perhaps quality. Our analysis of the physi-
cian cooperative theory examines only closed staﬀhospitals. The exposition
is organized by outcome; with respect to each outcome we derive predic-
tions for the altruism, physician cooperative, and noncontractible quality
models, in that order. The discussion focuses on the intuition behind each
prediction. The results can easily be derived in a more formal manner.19
Shape of Firm Supply Curve
In the altruism model, the supply curves are upward sloping. The supply
curve for an FP ﬁrm is standard: the marginal cost (MC) curve in the rele-
vant range (upward-sloping section above intersection with the average
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Table 6.1 Parameters Implied by the Three Major Models of NFP Firm Behavior
Altruism Physician Cooperative Noncontractible Quality
Induced utility Preference for (y, q)  No preference for (y, q):  Preference for eﬀort: 
permitted: v(I, y, q) v(I) v(I, e)
Output (N) Zero proﬁts:  No restriction No restriction
N = {y (y) = 0}
Income No perks: I = d( ) = 0 Pro rata distribution:  Perks: I = d( )   
I = d( ) =  /x0
Price pn = p f pn = p f p(y, q – mE[ei]) 
Higher price conditional
on contractible quality:
pn(q)   p f(q)
Costs No tax breaks:  No tax breaks (so equal  c(y, q, e) 
E(cn) = E(c f), etc. factor prices): wn = wf No tax breaks: 
E(cn) = E(c f), etc.
19. Readers interested in more formal demonstration should refer to Lakdawalla and
Philipson (1998, 2002), which works through the baseline model (albeit only under the as-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ycost [AC] curve). The supply curve for the NFP ﬁrm, however, is given by
the AC curve above the intersection between the AC and MC curves. This
is because of the nondistribution constraint or of NFP regulations that are
assumed to constrain NFP ﬁrms to have zero proﬁts (N   {(y, q) (y, q)
  0}). Because the AC curve lies below and has a smaller slope than the
MC curve in the relevant range, the supply curve for individual NFP ﬁrms
is more elastic than that for FP ﬁrms.
In the physician cooperative model, the supply curve for individual ﬁrms
may be backward bending under common conditions such as diminishing
returns to scale (see Meade 1972). The reason is that an increase in the
price of output raises both the marginal product of physician labor and the
average product of physician labor. However, the marginal product of la-
bor rises less than the average product of labor when there are diminishing
returns. This means that average earnings could be further raised if physi-
cians were dismissed from the medical staﬀ.20 This in turn reduces output.
In the noncontractible quality model, all ﬁrms will have identical
upward-sloping supply functions. Without more information on the econ-
omies between production of quantity and quality, one supposes that the
supply curves for quantity are the same. In the case of an increase in the
price of quality, however, the reaction of NFP ﬁrms is expected to be
stronger as such ﬁrms are constrained by the nondistribution constraint
from distributing rents as cash proﬁts. (NFPs can pay rents only as perks.)
Factor Demand Behavior
Although there may be great diﬀerences between the output behavior of
ﬁrms run by owners/patrons with traditional income-maximizing prefer-
ences and those run by owners/patrons with nonstandard preferences, the
diﬀerences in owners’/patrons’ preferences over output may not aﬀect in-
put demands. In general, the predictions of cost minimization for the FP
ﬁrm apply to a ﬁrm run by an owner/patron with preferences over the
quantity and quality of output as long as we are talking about conditional
factor demand, that is, demand for inputs for a given level of output. The
unconditional factor demand is simply the conditional factor demand at
the optimal level of output. This implies that output predictions translate
into factor demand predictions whenever the conditional factor demand
behavior, as implied by cost minimization, is identical for both types of
ﬁrm. In the altruism model the NFP ﬁrm produces along the AC curve,
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20. In the discriminatory sharing case described in note 12, the total number of physicians
in the hospital will increase as output price increase, but the mix of “member” to “hired”
physician would change (lower number of members and higher number of hired physicians).
This result coincides with the analysis presented by Ben-Ner (1984), who shows that as long
as the income per member is higher than the competitive wage, the labor-managed ﬁrm would
gradually replace its members with perfectly substitutable non-member labor. By so doing,
that the labor-managed ﬁrm will become a competitive ﬁrm (with one member as the owner).which is always further out than the MC curve; therefore all factor demand
curves of NFPs are further out. It is unclear whether there is a diﬀerence in
shape.
In the physician cooperative model, NFPs are inelastic to changes in
physician wages. We can see this in ﬁgure 6.1. The closed staﬀ hospital
chooses output based on the intersection between the hospital’s MRP and
NARP. That choice does not depend on the market wage, which is given by
the intersection of the MRP curve and the physician supply curve, s0. Con-
trast this to the FP hospital, which clearly reduces demand for physician
labor as s0 slides up. The marginal conditions for capital and nonphysician
labor in the closed staﬀ NFP are same as in FP ﬁrms (e.g., choose capital
such that the marginal product of capital equals the rental price). Hence,
conditional on quantity and physician-labor input, factor demands for
other inputs are identical to FP ﬁrms. Conditional only on quantity, how-
ever, demand for capital and nonphysician labor may be higher in NFP
ﬁrms depending on the economies between physician labor and other in-
puts. The NFP ﬁrm produces less quantity than FP ﬁrms, so unconditional
demand for physician labor is lower. Unconditional demand for other fac-
tors depends on the ﬁrm’s technology.
In the noncontractible quality model, NFP ﬁrms produce higher levels
of quality. Because higher quality requires more inputs and because the
cost functions of FP ﬁrms are at least as low as those of NFP ﬁrms after
owners/patrons select organizational form, NFP ﬁrms have higher condi-
tional factor demands. No prediction can be generated regarding uncon-
ditional factor demand without knowing more about the exact nature of
the ﬁrm’s technology for joint production of quantity and quality.
Firm Size
In the altruism model, since owners/patrons of NFPs draw direct utility
from quantity, NFPs are bigger controlling for quality. If we do not control
for quality, we might get larger FP ﬁrms as owners/patrons of NFPs with
preferences for quality substitute quality for quantity. This is more likely
the stronger is the NFP owner’s/patron’s preference for quality relative to
quantity.
In the physician cooperative model, NFP hospitals have smaller labor
forces than FP hospitals, controlling for capital inputs. It is evident from
ﬁgure 6.1 that with a closed staﬀ, size is given by intersection of the MRP
and the NARP of physician labor curves. With FP hospitals, size is given
by intersection of the MRP curve and the physician supply curve. That
suggests that closed staﬀ NFPs should be smaller than FPs, as measured
by their physician labor forces.21
196 Anup Malani, Tomas Philipson, and Guy David
21. We may observe this result even if the physician cooperative model does not accurately
describe reality. NFP hospitals get tax breaks on capital inputs (e.g., property tax breaks).In the noncontractible quality model the NFP ﬁrm is expected to deliver
higher quality; in this sense size or production should be measured in lev-
els of quality produced and not in (for example) patients’ days. The non-
contractible quality model does not supply any insight into the physical
level of production. For a given volume of patient, the quality of service per
patient is higher in NFP hospitals, yet the volume of patients might be
higher or lower depending on the relative attractiveness of NFP versus FP
hospitals to patients and the duration of high- versus low-quality treat-
ment (i.e., if patients receiving high-quality treatment have longer hospi-
talization periods, controlling for the size of the hospital, a high-quality
hospital would treat fewer patients).
Quality
In the altruism model, NFP market shares at each level of quality de-
pend on the total demand for that level of quality. Not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms, due
to donations, satisfy initial demand at each level of quality. Because a lim-
ited number of owners/patrons prefer quality of output or a limited
amount of donations ﬁnance the preferences of such owners/patrons, once
NFP output rises to the level where the average costs of such hospitals ex-
ceeds the minimum average costs of FP hospitals, the latter will begin to
enter. Due to the scarcity of altruism, FP ﬁrms are the marginal ﬁrms at
each level of quality.
In the physician cooperative model, there is no diﬀerence between NFP
and FP ﬁrms because quality considerations are omitted from the analysis.
Still, one commonly used measure of quality is the number of physicians
per bed. This measure is closely related to the physician-to-capital ratio,
which the model predicts would be lower in NFP hospitals because physi-
cian cooperatives use less physician labor at each level of output.
In the noncontractible quality model, NFPs produce higher levels of
noncontractible quality because they have less incentive (rents distributed
as perks rather than cash) to exert eﬀort to cut costs by reducing such qual-
ity.
Average Cost
In the altruism model, NFP ﬁrms have higher average costs controlling
for quality. They produce where the market price equals average cost due
to the inability of owners/patrons to take proﬁts home as income (or due to
the restriction that proﬁts must be zero). For-proﬁt ﬁrms produce where
market price equals marginal cost. Since the AC curve lies below the MC
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Therefore, these hospitals choose an input mix that favors capital, controlling for the level of
output. To test whether the smaller size of NFP physician labor demand is due to the coop-
erative model or simple proﬁt maximization in the face of tax subsidies for capital inputs, one
ought to regress labor force size on an indicator for organizational form, total capital inputs,
and the state property tax rate.curve, this implies lower-quantity output and thus average costs for the FP
ﬁrms.
In the physician cooperative model, because proﬁt distribution encour-
ages ineﬃciently high use of capital for every given level of output, average
costs are higher for NFP ﬁrms, conditional on output. One cannot make a
clear unconditional prediction because NFP ﬁrms tend to produce less
than FP ﬁrms. With eﬃcient capital-labor ratios, average costs rise with
output in the region to the right of the intersection of the AC and MC
curves. Therefore, it is possible that a lower-output but ineﬃcient NFP
ﬁrm has lower average costs than a higher-output, eﬃcient FP ﬁrm.
In the contractible quality model, NFP ﬁrms have higher costs control-
ling for quantity and noncontractible quality because they exert less cost-
cutting eﬀort (and thus produce more noncontractible quality). Without
controlling for quantity and contractible quality, it is hard to predict rela-
tive average costs. Higher noncontractible quality may be associated with
higher levels of quantity or lower levels of quantity, and thus higher aver-
age costs or perhaps lower average costs even taking into account the ad-
ditional noncontractible quality produced.
6.2 Industry-Level Predictions of Existing Theories
In this section we derive predictions concerning industry-level behavior
of NFP ﬁrms in markets with mixed production under the assumptions of
each of the three primary models described in section 6.1. Table 6.3 sum-
marizes our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst row examines whether each of the theories
supports an equilibrium with both NFP and FP production. The remain-
der of the table examines relative NFP behavior in response to four shocks
(to demand, to labor supply, to tax rates, and to public production) and
with respect to one outcome variable (quality-adjusted price).
Is Mixed Production Possible?
In perfect competition under the altruism model, mixed production is
possible if altruism is scarce either because donations are limited or there
is a limited number of owners/patrons with preferences for quantity or
quality in addition to proﬁts. If total demand cannot be satisﬁed by ﬁrms
run by output-preferring owners/patrons (who are aided by donations) at
a cost lower than the minimum average cost of FP ﬁrms (which are not
aided by donations) then FP ﬁrms will enter the market.
The physician cooperative model does not rule out mixed production as
long as there is a market for “memberships” in closed medical staﬀs. For
mixed production to exist, the income per member, in equilibrium, should
be at least equal to the market wage. If it is below the market wage, all
physicians would prefer to work for FP hospitals. If it exceeds the market
wage, all physicians would want to work for NFP ﬁrms. However, if there















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yare costs to membership in a closed staﬀ (e.g., limited mobility in the mar-
ket for the “member” as opposed to the “hired” worker) and these costs
vary across physicians, mixed production is possible. Doctors who face
high costs of membership will prefer FP hospitals. Doctors who earn
greater proﬁts from membership, even after deducting the costs of mem-
bership, will choose to join NFP hospitals.
For the remainder of this section, we will assume that the conditions for
mixed production under each of the three theories are satisﬁed and that
ﬁrms are in a mixed-production equilibrium.
Response to a Positive Demand Shock
In the altruism model a positive demand shock would induce entry by
FP ﬁrms, which we explained above are the marginal ﬁrms. One should see
a higher FP share of total market production as a result. In the physician
cooperative model, assuming NFP ﬁrms exist, the reaction of NFP ﬁrms
to positive demand shocks is contraction of output. (Recall that the coop-
erative’s supply function is backward bending if there are diminishing re-
turns to scale.) Thus, demand shocks are met by entry or expansion of FP
ﬁrms. In the noncontractible quality model a positive demand shock will
increase proﬁtability. Since higher proﬁtability increases the cost of taking
NFP status, the share of FP production will rise.
Response to a Negative (labor) Supply Shock
In the altruism model a positive labor supply shock (positive shock to
wages) increases production costs. Since FP ﬁrms are the marginal ﬁrms,
such a supply shock would lower FP share of production because FP ﬁrms
would exit. In the physician cooperative model FP ﬁrms reduce their labor
forces in response to supply shocks. Not-for-proﬁts do not, however, be-
cause they are indiﬀerent to increases in physician wage. Thus NFP share
would rise after a supply shock. Note, this prediction holds only if there is
mixed production. If the shock is severe enough, the market wage will ex-
ceed the optimal income per member, and all ﬁrms should convert to FP
form.22 In the noncontractible quality model a positive supply shock will
decrease proﬁtability, so the cost of taking NFP status decreases. Due to
the selection of owners/patrons into organizational form, a supply shock
will result in a lower FP share.
Response To an Increase in the Tax Rate (on FP ﬁrms)
In the altruism model an increase in the tax rate increases the production
costs. Since FP ﬁrms are the marginal ﬁrms, this would lower FP share of
production, as FP ﬁrms would exit. In the physician cooperative model,
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22. In the open staﬀ model (see note 12) you may get the opposite result, depending on the
relative elasticities of the NARP and MRP functions. The NARP is ﬂatter than the MRP, so
an inward (or upward) shift of the physician supply function causes the size of the open staﬀ
at the NFP to fall more than the size of the staﬀ in a FP hospital.the eﬀect of a hike in the tax rate on NFP share is ambiguous. There are two
countervailing eﬀects. Initially FP ﬁrms will exit the market as their costs
rise. As supply falls, price will rise. This in turn may induce NFP ﬁrms to
cut their labor forces. This will result in an increase in the scale or entry of
FP ﬁrms (which negates, at least in part, the initial exit of FP ﬁrms). In the
noncontractible quality model an increase in the tax rate will decrease
proﬁtability, so the relative cost of taking NFP status decreases. This will
result in the selection of more owners/patrons into the NFP form, result-
ing in a lower FP share.
Response To a Reduction in Government Production
In the altruism model, since the FP ﬁrm is the marginal ﬁrm this would
increase the share of production in FP ﬁrms. Not-for-proﬁt production is
unaltered. In the physician cooperative model a reduction in output by
public hospitals resembles a decrease in supply. For-proﬁt ﬁrms are likely
to enter as they face higher residual demand. In the noncontractible qual-
ity model, exit of government ﬁrms would decrease supply and hence in-
crease the new equilibrium price for any given level of observable quality.
The higher proﬁtability would result in a higher cost of taking NFP status.
This would result in a higher FP share.
Prices
In the altruism model, prices are determined by the marginal ﬁrm, which
is FP. The NFP ﬁrms charge the same prices but use excess revenues to fund
the production—actually consumption from the perspective of the owner/
patron—of greater quantity and perhaps quality. In the physician cooper-
ative model, there is no reason for the cooperative to charge a higher price
than the FP hospital. From the consumer’s perspective, both types of ﬁrm
produce the same level of quality. In the noncontractible quality model, be-
cause consumers expect that NFP ﬁrms will provide higher level of non-
contractible quality, consumers are willing to pay more for NFP output.
Summary
The main lesson to draw from the analysis in this section is that there are
few equilibrium-level outcomes regarding which the three theories of NFP
behavior discussed in this paper generate diﬀering predictions. This limits
our ability to use empirical evidence to discriminate among the theories.
From a methodological perspective, this reduces the value of the diﬀer-
ent theories, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the analysis suggests that the noncon-
tractible quality model generates virtually the same predictions as a variant
of the altruism model, which supposes that some owners/patrons have a
preference for the production of noncontractible quality. The only out-
comes along which the noncontractible quality story might generate diﬀer-
ent predictions than this modiﬁed altruism model are the eﬀect of a reduc-
tion in donations (which we do not study in this paper), the shape of ﬁrms’
Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonproﬁt Sector 201supply curves, and unconditional factor demand. If donations dried up, the
noncontractible quality model would predict that NFP ﬁrms might still ex-
ist as signals of noncontractible quality. The altruism model would predict
that there would be no NFP ﬁrms in equilibrium because there would be
nothing to ﬁnance their owners’/patrons’ consumption of quantity or qual-
ity. With respect to the shape of ﬁrms’ supply curves and unconditional fac-
tor demand, the noncontractible quality model has no strong predictions,
whereas a modiﬁed altruism model would predict the same outcomes as the
altruism model with output- or quality-preferring owners/patrons.
6.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we address two questions: whether there exist empirical
studies that permit us to discriminate among diﬀerent theories of NFP
ﬁrm behavior, and what such studies actually suggest about the relative
performance of diﬀerent theories. Superior performance is deﬁned by the
ability to generate predictions on a set of common outcomes that are more
consistent with the data than the predictions generated by competing the-
ories. The main lesson of this section is that more empirical work is re-
quired comparing NFP and FP ﬁrms on those outcome measures for
which the diﬀerent theories generate diﬀerent predictions. Our focus here
is on the health care sector in the United States, although we suspect our
conclusion about the state of the empirical literature would be the same if
we examined other sectors of the economy that have mixed production.
This section develops in two parts. The ﬁrst examines evidence on ﬁrm-
level behavior of NFPs and FPs. The second examines evidence on indus-
try-level or equilibrium behavior.
6.3.1 Firm-Level Comparisons
Table 6.4 summarizes the empirical evidence on the six ﬁrm-level out-
come variables. These variables (output supply, conditional and uncondi-
tional factor demand, ﬁrm size, quality, and average cost) are the same
ones for which table 6.2 listed the predictions of the three NFP theories ex-
amined in section 6.1. The stub column lists the outcome; the ﬁrst column
then indicates which of the three theories generate diﬀering predictions re-
garding that outcome; the second summarizes the empirical evidence we
have on that outcome; and the third reconciles the empirical evidence and
the predictions of each theory.
Shape of Firm Supply Curve
Altruism models predict that NFP supply is upward sloping but more
elastic than FP supply. The physician cooperative model, however, predicts
that the supply curve may be backward bending. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of any studies that attempt to compare the output supply curves of
NFP and FP ﬁrms.
202 Anup Malani, Tomas Philipson, and Guy DavidConditional Factor Demand
While altruism models predict identical conditional factor demands re-
gardless of ownership status, the physician cooperative model predicts that
conditional demand for physicians will be smaller in NFP ﬁrms and the
noncontractible quality model predicts that conditional factor demand for
inputs generally will be larger in NFP ﬁrms. Available studies suggest that
NFP health care providers have higher conditional demand for labor.
Philipson and Lakdawalla (2000) examined data from the 1995 National
Nursing Home Survey and found that FP homes employed fewer regis-
tered nurses, aides, and total employees than FP homes, holding total beds
(for example) constant. They also found that NFP homes also used fewer
doctors, but that result was not statistically signiﬁcant. This result is con-
sistent with that of Sloan and Steinwald (1980), who examined much older
data (from 1969 to 1975) and found that NFP hospitals employ more reg-
istered nurses and non-nurse employees than FP hospitals. These studies,
for obvious reasons, cast some doubt on the altruism theories (unless some
sort of labor-input preference on the part of owners/patrons is assumed).23
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Table 6.4 Empirical Evidence on Firm-Level Predictions
Theories Generate Summary of
Outcome Diﬀerent Predictions? Empirical Evidence Conclusion
Shape of ﬁrm  Yes No data None
supply curve
Conditional  Yes NFPs have higher  Data tend to support the 
factor demand conditional factor demand  non-contractible quality 
for nonphysician labor model
Unconditional  Yes NFPs have larger labor  Data supports the 
factor demand forces altruism model and rejects 
physician cooperative 
model
Firm size Yes NFP hospitals generally  Data are inconclusive
larger; NFP nursing homes 
may be smaller
Quality Yes Uncertain whether NFPs  Data are inconclusive
produce higher or lower 
quality
Average cost No Uncertain whether NPFs  Data are inconclusive
have higher or lower costs
23. This inference requires a caveat. Philipson and Lakdawalla (2000) control for price and
output. In the altruism models, FP ﬁrms produce the same output and price as NFP ﬁrms only
if they are more eﬃcient than NFP ﬁrms. In such circumstances, it is possible that FPs use
fewer labor inputs because of technology, not owner preferences. The predictions in Table 2
assume identical technology. Thus the ﬁndings of Philipson and Lakdawalla (2000) can be
squared with the altruism models if owners have heterogeneous production technology.Philipson and Lakdawalla (2000) indirectly casts doubt on the physician
cooperative theory because it does not ﬁnd that conditional demand for
physicians is signiﬁcantly smaller in NFP homes.
Unconditional Factor Demand
The altruism models predict that unconditional factor demand will be
larger in NFP ﬁrms, while the physician cooperative model predicts that
that unconditional demand for physician labor will be smaller at NFP hos-
pitals. Because the noncontractible quality model makes no prediction
about quantity of output, it has no prediction for unconditional factor de-
mands. The available evidence suggests that NFP hospitals have larger un-
conditional demand for labor.
Existing studies indicate that NFP hospitals and NFP nursing homes
have larger labor forces than their FP counterparts. For example, Gentry
and Penrod (2000) examined nearly 5,000 short-term hospitals from the
Health Care Financing Agency’s (HCFA’s) 1995 Medicare Cost Reports
and observe that the median NFP hospital has more employees than the
median FP hospitals (see also Rose-Ackerman 1996). Philipson (2000)
studied the National Nursing Home Surveys from 1989 to 1994. He found
that the FP homes tend to have 86 to 91 percent as many full-time equiva-
lent employees as NFP homes.
These data support the altruism models and reject the predictions of the
physician cooperative model. There is one caveat, however. Predictions re-
garding conditional and unconditional factor demand are generated hold-
ing quality constant, but the existing data on conditional and uncondi-
tional factor demand do not control for quality. This fact also reduces the
ability of existing empirical studies to discriminate among theories of NFP
ﬁrms based on their prediction regarding ﬁrm size.
Firm Size
The predictions of the three theories of NFP behavior regarding ﬁrm
size, as measured by quantity output, mirror the theories’ predictions re-
garding unconditional factor demand because the latter predictions are
based on quantity output. Altruism-based theories predict that NFP will
be larger; the physician cooperative model predicts they will be smaller;
and the noncontractible quality model has no prediction.
The empirical data on ﬁrm size are, however, a bit more complicated
than data on unconditional factor demand. Numerous studies demon-
strate that NFP hospitals have more beds, admissions, and discharges than
FP hospitals (see Frank and Salkever 2000 and Gentry and Penrod 2000).
The former examines American Hospital Association (AHA) data on all
hospitals from 1970 to 1995. David (2001) examined the same data from
1960 to 1999, however, and found that NFP and FP hospitals are converg-
ing in hospital size. For example, the ratio of average NFP to FP beds has
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regarding average admissions. David reports that this convergence is due
to the growth in the average size of FP hospitals.24 To complicate matters
further, Philipson (2000) reported that, between 1989 and 1994, FP nurs-
ing homes tended to be more than 10 percent larger than NFP homes, as
measured by average number of beds or patient days.
Thus data from hospitals tend to support the altruism theories (al-
though less and less each year), but data from nursing homes tend to sup-
port the physician cooperative theory. It should be noted that the data from
each of the studies discussed in the last paragraph were presented in sum-
mary statistic form; they were not subject to rigorous analysis.
Quality
Ironically, the two ﬁrm-level outcomes—quality and average cost—on
which there is the least diﬀerence in predictions across the three theories of
NFP behavior are those on which there has been the most (and the most
rigorous) empirical work. With respect to quality, the altruism models pre-
dict that NFP ﬁrms will produce high quality if owners/patrons who chose
the NFP form have a preference for quality, and the noncontractible qual-
ity models predict that NFP ﬁrms will produce higher noncontractible
quality because the nondistribution constraint softens incentives to shirk
on such quality. The diﬀerence between these predictions—the noncon-
tractible quality model predicts only higher noncontractible quality—may
not be amenable to testing because whether any measure of quality ob-
servable to an econometrician is truly noncontractible for consumers is
questionable. The physician cooperative model also generates a prediction
for quality, but it is no diﬀerent than its prediction for conditional factor
demand for labor: NFP ﬁrms have lower physician-capital ratios. This is a
prediction about quality only if physician-capital ratios are a measure of
quality.
The empirical literature comparing the quality output of NFP and FP
health care providers can roughly be divided into three classes based on
how they measure quality. One class focuses on health outcomes; a second
on third-party assessments, such as regulatory violations and accredita-
tion; and the third on intensity of use of certain quality-correlated inputs,
such as physician labor. The most widely accepted measure of quality is
health outcomes, so we focus more on this class of empirical studies.
Studies of outcomes do not provide a decisive answer to the question of
whether NFP’s provide higher quality of care. Early studies were limited
because they employed cross-sectional data and lacked great controls for
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24. David hypothesizes that the convergence might have been induced by the creation of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1966. These programs may have made previously un-
proﬁtable patients proﬁtable to FP hospitals, encouraging their growth.unobserved severity (see, e.g., Shortell and Hughes 1989 and Hartz et al.
1988). If patients select higher-quality hospitals when they have more se-
vere illnesses and this severity is not observable by the econometrician,
then estimates of the quality of high-quality hospitals will be biased down-
ward. Keeler et al. (1992) tried to address this problem by gathering exten-
sive clinical data on patients in their sample. Their study looked at elderly
Medicare patients diagnosed with congestive heart failure, acute myocar-
dial infarction (AMI), stroke, or hip fracture at 297 hospitals in 1981–82
and 1985–86. They found no diﬀerence in health outcomes between NFP
and FP hospitals on average, but noted that FP hospitals appeared to have
better outcomes on average than NFP nonteaching hospitals. The problem
with Keeler et al.’s approach is that, because gathering detailed data is so
expensive, their sample size is quite small.
Gowrisankaran and Town (1999) tried to address the patient selection
problem by using a patient’s distance to the hospital as an instrumental
variable. Looking at data from Southern California between 1989 and
1994, they found that elderly patients admitted for pneumonia at NFP hos-
pitals have 10 percent lower mortality than those admitted to FP hospitals.
However, when Geweke, Gowrisankaran, and Town (2001) returned to the
sample—actually a subsample of 78,000 Medicare patients admitted to
Los Angeles County hospitals for pneumonia between 1989 and 1992—
with more sophisticated estimation methods and separated NFP into
teaching and nonteaching hospitals, they reached a diﬀerent conclusion.
While they found teaching hospitals were better than nonteaching hospi-
tals, they also found no statistical diﬀerence between FP and nonteaching
NFP hospitals. This distinction between teaching and nonteaching NFP
hospitals is important because it is unclear whether NFP status or teach-
ing status induces hospitals to provide higher quality in the samples.
McClellan and Staiger (2000) tried a diﬀerent method to control for pa-
tient selection. They restricted their sample to patients hospitalized for
AMI or ischemic heart disease. Such ailments progress rapidly, requiring
patients to go to the nearest hospital. Looking at a sample of 550,000 pa-
tients at 4,000 hospitals, they initially ﬁnd that, on average, FP hospitals
have higher ninety-day mortality rates. However, the authors note that,
just as estimates of quality diﬀerences may be biased by patient selection,
they may also be biased by hospital selection (e.g., the choice by hospitals
of where to locate). To control for this, they looked in detail at three coun-
ties with mixed production. This analysis reveals that, if anything, FP hos-
pitals perform better than NFP hospitals. They also note that the small
diﬀerence between NFP and FP hospitals masks huge variation within
these types of hospitals. Shen (2002) tried to extend McClellan and Staiger
by looking not just at a few markets but at the entire United States and by
grouping NFP and FP hospitals for comparison, based on (for example) a
distance-matching scheme. She found that FP hospitals have at least 3 per-
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analysis did not, however, draw a distinction between NFP teaching and
nonteaching hospitals.
The mixed conclusions of the health outcome studies can also be found
in studies that examine patient complaints, violations of government
quality-control regulations, and accreditation. Compare, for example,
Mark (1996; NFP psychiatric hospitals experience fewer complaints or vi-
olations), Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986; NFP nursing homes experience
fewer complaints but the same level of violations), and Herzlinger and
Krasker (1987; no diﬀerence in hospital accreditation). A further problem
with these studies is that they have small sample sizes and violations and
complaints are infrequent, suggesting a low signal-to-noise ratio.
Studies that examine input intensity—in particular, physician-labor-to-
output ratios—are no more helpful. Although they ﬁnd that NFP pro-
viders have higher conditional demand for physician labor (as discussed
above), it is unclear why a high labor-to-capital or labor-to-output ratio in-
dicates higher quality. It seems a superior approach would be to look at
outcomes directly, rather than to make implicit assumptions about the pro-
duction function for quality.
Overall, it does not appear that the literature on quality diﬀerences be-
tween NFP and FP health care providers oﬀers much support to any of the
three theories of NFP behavior.
Average Cost
All three theories of NFP ﬁrm behavior predict that NFP ﬁrms will have
higher average costs than FP ﬁrms. Therefore, empirical work on the
diﬀerence in costs of NFP and FP health care providers theoretically can-
not be used to discriminate among the three theories, although it can be
used to reject all three theories. Work to date, however, cannot do even the
latter. The empirical literature on cost, like that on quality, can be sorted
into three groups. Earlier work focused on paired comparisons of NFP and
FP hospitals. This literature yielded conﬂicting results and the data may be
too old to have relevance in today’s changed marketplace. Compare Lewin,
Derzon, and Marguiles (1981) and Pattison and Katz (1983) with Sloan
and Vraciu (1983) and Herzlinger and Krasker (1987). The former studies
found that FP providers are more costly than NFP providers. The latter
studies found that FP providers are no diﬀerent or less costly than NFP
providers. Later studies employed regression analysis. They controlled for
case mix, for example, but did not yield clear conclusions. For instance,
Becker and Sloan (1985) found that FP hospitals have higher costs per pa-
tient day, but lower costs adjusted for admission. The third major group of
cost studies used linear programming techniques to estimate frontier pro-
duction functions. The ineﬃciency of a given hospital is measured by its
distance from (outside) the frontier. The frontier analysis studies used
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Jadlow (1982) found FP hospitals more eﬃcient; Koop, Osiewalski, and
Steel (1997) found them less eﬃcient; and Vitaliano and Toren (1996) and
Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni (1994) found no diﬀerence between FPs
and NFPs. Moreover, few studies of costs, regardless of the methodology,
have serious controls for quality (see Newhouse 1994) or account for
changes in payment schemes (i.e., the shift from fee-for-service insurance
to managed health care) and the eﬀects these changes have on cost-
minimizing behavior.
6.3.2 Industry-Level Comparisons
Table 6.5 summarizes the existing empirical evidence on the diﬀerences
in response to an increase in demand, an increase in labor costs, an increase
in tax rates, and a decrease in public production; and the evidence on
diﬀerence in prices. As in table 6.4, the stub column lists the outcome, the
ﬁrst column then indicates which theories generate diﬀerent predictions re-
garding that outcome, the second column summarizes the empirical evi-
dence on that outcome; and the third reconciles the empirical evidence and
the predictions of each theory.
Response To a Positive Demand Shock
All the theories of NFP behavior examined in this paper predict that an
FP’s share of market production will rise in response to a positive demand
shock. This is roughly consistent with the empirical literature that has ex-
plored the question. In an early study, Steinwald and Neuhauser (1970)
found that, during 1960s, statewide population growth appeared to drive
growth in the market share of FP hospitals. Relman (1980) provided evi-
dence that the 1966 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid subsidizing in-
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Table 6.5 Empirical Evidence on Firm-Level Predictions
Theories Generate Summary of
Outcome Diﬀerent Predictions? Empirical Evidence Conclusion
Response to a  No Probably increases FP  Data do not discrim-
positive demand shock share inate between theories
Response to a negative  No No data Data do not discrim-
(labor) supply shock inate between theories
Response to an  Yes Probably reduces NFP  Data do not discrim-
increase in the tax rate share inate between theories
Response to a reduc- No Increases FP share Data do not discrim-
tion in government  inate between theories
production
Prices Yes No evident diﬀerence  Data tend to support 
in prices altruism modelduced signiﬁcant growth in the market share of FP hospitals. Finally, Gul-
ley and Santerre (1993) found that government regulation aimed at con-
straining price depressed FP market share.
The evidence on this issue is not, however, unanimous in its support of
the predictions of the three theories. For example, Steinwald and
Neuhauser (1970) also found that growth in per capita income is negatively
correlated with growth in the FP market share. Moreover, Lakdawalla and
Philipson (1998) ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of Medicaid subsidies on FP
share in the nursing home market is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Response To a Negative (labor) Supply Shock
There are no studies we are aware of that examine the eﬀect of such a
shock. However, even if there were, they would not permit us to discrimi-
nate among theories of NFP behavior because all three that we examine
predict an increase in FP share of production in response to an increase in
physician wage.
Response To an Increase in the Tax Rate
The altruism model and the noncontractible quality model predict that
an increase in the tax rate on FP ﬁrms should reduce FP market share. The
physician cooperative model suggests that the eﬀect on FP market share of
a hike in the tax rate is ambiguous. However, that model does predict that
the size of medical staﬀs in NFP hospitals should fall after a tax hike.
The empirical literature on NFP behavior generally supports the pre-
dictions of the altruism and noncontractible quality models. Using a
twenty-year panel of U.S. states, Gulley and Santerre (1993) found in a
state-ﬁxed-eﬀects regression that corporate and property tax increases
raise the market share of NFP hospitals. Moreover, in a national cross sec-
tion of several NFP industries by city and by state, Hansmann (1987) ﬁnds
corporate and property taxes to be jointly signiﬁcant in raising NFP mar-
ket share (although their separate signiﬁcance is not robust). Finally, al-
though Chang and Tuckman (1990) found in a cross section of Tennessee
counties that increases in property taxes do not signiﬁcantly increase the
market share of NFP hospitals, their study suﬀers from problems of small-
sample size.
The empirical literature does not permit comment on the physician co-
operative model. There are no studies that examine the eﬀect of changes in
commercial-enterprise tax rates on the size of medical staﬀs at NFP hos-
pitals.
Response To a Reduction in Government Production
All three theories of NFP behavior predict that a reduction of govern-
ment production should increase the FP share of health care production.
This prediction ﬁnds strong support in the empirical literature. Gulley and
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of FP hospitals (measured by beds) rose by 5.5 percent, while the aggregate
market share of public hospitals fell by 5.3 percent. Lefgren and Philipson
(1999) documented the continuation of this trend through the early 1990s
and, furthermore, found that the aggregate share of FP hospitals has risen
almost entirely at the expense of the aggregate share of public hospitals. Fi-
nally, Ettner (1999) found that FP psychiatric hospitals have replaced the
output lost to the departure of many public psychiatric hospitals over the
last few decades.
Prices
Neither the altruism nor the physician cooperative model predicts any
diﬀerence in price across ownership form, controlling for contractible
quality. The noncontractible quality model predicts, however, that NFP
hospitals can charge higher prices controlling for such quality because they
provide greater noncontractible quality. The data provide little support for
this prediction. The only study to investigate the existence of a price pre-
mium is Philipson (2000).25 Using ﬁrm-level data from the 1985 and 1995
National Nursing Home Surveys, Philipson estimated a hedonic demand
function for nursing homes. He regressed private price per day on a dummy
for ownership type, output, input, and quality controls (with quality mea-
sured by whether a home is certiﬁed) by the amount of services provided
and by location in a city. His estimates suggest that NFP homes received
about a 5 percent premium in 1985 and no premium in 1995, but neither
ﬁgure is statistically signiﬁcant. It should be acknowledged that there are
problems with Philipson’s study. For example, in order for Philipson’s re-
gressions to reveal the hedonic demand function for nursing home care, he
must assume that the nursing home market is characterized by perfect
competition where all ﬁrms are in the same market and there is no hetero-
geneity among consumers (see Vogt 2000). However, certiﬁcate-of-need
laws impose barriers to entry into the nursing home market. This lack of
competition diminishes the substitution between NFP and FP care.26
These problems suggest further research is warranted.
Summary
Our review of the empirical literature suggests some obvious empirical
projects worth an investment of resources by scholars interested in NFP
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25. There is a large literature that attempts to answer the question, do NFP hospitals ex-
ploit market power as FP hospitals do? It is not immediately clear to us how the answer to this
question might permit use to distinguish the theories we examine here based on their predic-
tions regarding pricing behavior.
26. Moreover, it is unclear how informative a home’s private price is about the price a home
would charge in absence of regulations. Finally, Philipson must assume there are no diﬀer-
ences between NFP and FP ﬁrms that are observable to consumers, but not to the investiga-
tor. This is questionable given the limited controls for quality he employs.behavior. First, there is a need for data on the diﬀerences between the
supply curves of NFP and FP ﬁrms. The three dominant, formalized the-
ories of NFP ﬁrm behavior generate diﬀerent predictions regarding the
shapes of these curves, but to our knowledge there is no analysis of data on
this outcome. Second, there is a need for better empirical analysis of the
quantity and quality of output decisions of NFP versus FP ﬁrms. Again,
the three theories generate conﬂicting predictions, but existing empirical
studies have not arrived at a consensus on the diﬀerence, if any, between
NFP and FP ﬁrms with respect to these outcomes.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
If forced to choose among the three theories of NFP behavior, we would
weakly prefer the altruism theory. It enjoys the most empirical successes
and fewest empirical defeats, but only barely. The noncontractible quality
model is inconsistent with existing data on prices and on unconditional
factor demand for labor. The altruism model is inconsistent only with ex-
isting data on conditional factor demand for labor, and studies that exam-
ine factor demand (conditional and unconditional) do not control for
quality. Data on other ﬁrm-level outcomes are inconclusive and both the-
ories generate similar predictions on industry-level equilibrium outcomes.
Perhaps the better conclusion is that the physician cooperative model is not
empirically relevant. It enjoys no empirical successes over its competitors
and it is inconsistent with the data on unconditional factor demand.
It should be stressed, however, that a preference for the altruism theory
or a rejection of the physician cooperative theory rests on weak data. In-
deed, any attempt to elevate one theory of NFP behavior over others based
on the analysis in this paper would be subject to a number of caveats, in
addition to the obvious problem of decision making with imperfect em-
pirical data. Obviously we focus only on the health care sector and on a
small interval in time, typically the last two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. It may be, for example, that the physician cooperative model would
enjoy more empirical success if imposed upon data from the ﬁrst half of
this century (Starr 1982). More importantly, this paper examines only a
limited array of theories of NFP behavior. We focus on those that attempt
to explain NFP ﬁrm behavior by examining the preferences of and con-
straints on the owners/patrons of such ﬁrms. There are theories that focus
instead on the objectives of the government, of employees, or of donors
(see, e.g., Francois 2001). They may generate predictions more consistent
with the data.
The real purpose of this paper is to make a simple methodological point.
In order to determine why NFP ﬁrms exist and behave as they do, scholars
should focus on generating equilibrium predictions from competing theo-
ries with regard to a common set of measurable outcomes and then gather
Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonproﬁt Sector 211the data on these outcomes in order to discriminate among theories based
on their predictions.
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